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Abstract: The paper highlights the specific features of inter-
jurisdictional tax competition, and the related positive effects and risks. It 
analyzes the tax policy of the Bulgarian local authorities and discusses the 
factors limiting the inter-jurisdictional tax competition in our country. On the 
basis of specific data on the dynamics of the rates of key local taxes, it is 
argued that there is lack of a targeted policy of attracting and retaining a tax 
base through the manipulation of tax rates. It is concluded that the tax rates of 
the local taxes in Bulgaria are most often at the average of the legally defined 
upper and lower limits. It is supported that the low value of the ratio Revenues 
and aids in the municipal budgets / GDP does not motivate entrepreneurs to 
invest in a particular jurisdiction because of the differences in the absolute 
amount of local taxes. 
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he definition of the concept of tax competition between the different 
territorial structures, on the one hand, and the delineation of its specific 
characteristics, boundaries, advantages and disadvantages, on the other 
hand, is a complex process. Tax competition can be defined as an opportunity 
a structure, be it state or municipality, to determine independently both the tax 
base and the tax rate, that is, to carry out a tax policy, based on a relatively 
mobile tax base, attracted and maintained through targeted changes to the 
taxable base, tax rates and preferences granted. Inter-jurisdictional 
competition, in turn, most often implies strategic changes in tax rates, due to 
the fact that local powers in defining the tax base and allowances in most 
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countries are subject to restrictions. Within the above framework, the 
research area and the subject of this paper are inter-jurisdictional tax 
competition and the forms of the process in Bulgaria respectively. The 
research is based on the view that territorial structures in Bulgaria have 
limited opportunities, but at the same time (and more importantly) low 
willingness to pursue purposefully a strategically-oriented policy of tax 
competition. 
As a sovereign right of countries and jurisdictions to define the 
parameters of their fiscal policies, tax competition is linked to the movement 
of capital, goods, services and people to countries and territorial structures 
with more favourable tax allowances or lower tax rates. This movement, 
viewed as a competitive advantage in a market economy, leads (all other 
things being equal) to lowering prices for public goods and services, reducing 
unemployment and curbing the informal sector. The widely proclaimed 
benefits of regional tax autonomy depend directly on "local governments both 
having the authority to decide how much revenue they raise (by increasing 
rates – L. N.) and being openly responsible to their citizens for doing so." 
(Bahl, R. and Bird, R., 2008, p. 8). It is not for nothing that Pierre Garello 
binds competition to freedom (Garello, P., 2007, p. 2). In addition, tax 
allowances, correlating directly with competition in fiscal policy, have the 
potential (but not guaranteed) effect of rising economic growth rates, 
increasing investment, improving the performance of the administration, 
which in turn is a prerequisite for a favourable business environment and 
improvement of the efficiency of public sector functioning (Gurgur, Shah, 
2005; Wilson, Wildasin, 2001). To maintain well-functioning legislative, 
executive and judicial authorities, to curb bureaucracy, to enhance the quality 
of health, education, cultural services and infrastructure offered, all other 
things being equal, requires continuous and consistent efforts and fulfillment 
of the financial parameters of the state and municipal budgets. On this basis, it 
is logical to assume that the structures with higher tax revenue have better 
developed social systems and maintain a higher quality of public goods. 
Under this assumption, a possible reduction in the tax rate and / or the 
extension of the range of tax relief would be equivalent to a reduction in per 
capita income. Tax competition among the different territorial structures is 
therefore desirable and necessary, provided that the different tax bases and tax 
rates as a basis for determining the tax liability do not have a negative impact 
on the relative share of own revenues in the structure of the budget revenues 
of the respective jurisdiction, while at the same time lead to the improvement 
of the business environment and the investment prospects for the region, the 
infrastructure and the quality of the local public goods. 
It is known that the tax liability is calculated as a product between the 
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tax base and the tax rate. Therefore, the analysis of tax competition between 
the different territorial structures in Bulgaria requires consideration of the 
ability of local authorities and the government to influence each of the two 
elements that comprise the tax liability. 
A tax base, as an element that determines the amount of tax due, is 
different for the main local taxes to which it relates: property taxes, 
inheritance taxes, gift taxes, taxes on acquisition of property for consideration, 
transport vehicle taxes, licence taxes, and tourist taxes. The normative 
regulation of the first element that forms the tax base is clearly laid down in 
the Local Taxes and Fees Act, where the items, subject to taxation and the tax 
relief options are precisely defined. The law provides for the items that are 
exempt or are not taxed with the corresponding local tax, too. Therefore, the 
Bulgarian municipalities have no opportunity to influence the size of the tax 
base, which, as we have already noted, is one of the elements determining the 
absolute amount of the specific local tax. This is quite normal, given that as 
per the provisions of the Public Finance Act the structure of the municipal 
budget includes local taxes - "as per conditions, procedures and ranges, laid 
down by law" (Public Finance Act, Article 45, para. 1). The centralized 
determination of the tax base gives grounds to conclude that the powers of the 
state, in the person of its legislative body, are greater than those of the 
municipal parliament. 
We can arrive at the conclusion that the tax base of local taxes is not a 
tool that municipal administrations can use to improve their competitive 
advantages. Moreover, this element of tax liability does not provide an 
answer to the question which municipality provides investors with better 
business conditions. Therefore, we cannot speak of tax competition between 
the territorial structures considered as an opportunity for the Bulgarian 
municipalities to determine their tax base independently. Notwithstanding the 
above, it should be specified that the legally provided methodology for 
determining the tax base of individual local taxes is a prerequisite for a 
different absolute amount of the tax liability. Evidence in this respect is the 
fact that the tax assessment for real estate in villages and small settlements is 
lower than in the jurisdictions of the district centers and the capital. Patent tax, 
on the other hand, varies according to the location of the items, and ships, 
sailing yachts and motor yachts cannot be considered taxable in all 
municipalities. Therefore, the order, the conditions and the scope of the tax 
base of the local taxes are legally regulated, but the taxable base established 
for the same items may be different for the different jurisdictions and result in 
different municipal revenues. 
The second basic element determining the size of the tax liability is the 
tax rate. In Bulgaria, we can speak of tax competition between the different 
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territorial structures after the Constitution was revised in 2007. According to 
Art. 141 para. 3 of the Basic Law of the country "The municipal council shall 
determine the size of local taxes under conditions, by a procedure and within 
the frames, established by law." (Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, 
Article 141, paragraph 3). The empowerment of local parliaments to 
determine the tax rates of local taxes is the first step towards creating 
conditions for tax competition between municipalities. However, it should be 
noted, that the tax rates can be altered within the lower and upper limits 
stipulated in the Local Taxes and Fees Act. The answer to the question 
whether the legislative initiative for a change in the Constitution and the 
LTFA directly correlates with tax competition between local jurisdictions 
requires an analysis of the dynamics of tax rates in the different territorial 
structures by types of local taxes (see Table 1). 
The analysis of data related to the size of the tax rate for non-
residential property of legal entities gives grounds for making several 
important conclusions and summaries. At the statutory lower and upper limits 
of the real estate tax of 0.1 and 4.5 per thousand respectively, on average for 
all territorial structures in Bulgaria the tax rate for 2012 is 1.69 per thousand, 
for 2013 – 1. 77 per thousand, for 2014 – 1.77 per thousand and for 2015 – 
1.79 per thousand. Therefore, the tax rate dynamics for the tax analyzed is 
very narrow, significantly above the lower limit of 0.1 per thousand. 
The highest growth is observed in the tax rate of the non-residential 
property tax of the legal entities in the Pleven district - from 1.73 per thousand 
in 2012, it has reached 2.75 per thousand in 2015 (59% growth). For the 
Yambol-based jurisdiction, the tax rate is within the range of 1.28 per 
thousand in 2012 and 1.87 per thousand (46% growth) in 2015. In the territory 
structure with center Veliko Tarnovo the growth of the tax rate of the real 
estate tax for the analyzed period is 11%, for the jurisdictions with center 
Vidin and Pazardzhik this growth is 10% and 15% respectively. 
In the territorial structure with center Sliven, the tax rate for the non-
residential property tax of legal entities decreases from 1.86 per thousand in 
2012 to 1.48 per thousand in 2015. There is also a slight decrease in the tax 
rate for the analyzed period in the jurisdiction with center Stara Zagora. In 
2015, the tax rate on the non-residential properties of legal entities is the 
lowest in the territorial structure with center Rousse – 1.31 per thousand and 
the highest in the jurisdiction with center V. Tarnovo – 2.22 per thousand. 
Therefore, the dynamics of the tax rate by individual territorial structures for 
2015 is insignificant and fluctuates within narrow limits.  
For the capital, the tax rate of the tax on non-residential property of 
legal entities does not change and for the analyzed period it is 1.88 per 
thousand. The real estate tax in the Razgrad municipality has not changed, 
Economic archive 4/2017  19 
either - for the period 2012-2015 it is 2.1 per thousand. For the jurisdictions 
with centers Blagoevgrad, Burgas, Varna, Montana, Rousse, Shumen, Silistra, 
the movement of the tax rate for the analyzed tax is within a very narrow 
range. 
The analysis of the data in Table 1 on the tax rate for transport 
vehicles with engine power between 74 kW and 110 kW gives reason to 
conclude that the changes in the tax rate by individual territorial structures 
are insignificant. Moreover, for a number of jurisdictions the tax rate on 
vehicles with the specified engine power for the analyzed period is the same. 
For example, for the jurisdiction with center Blagoevgrad it is BGN 1.18 per 
kW, for the territorial structure with center Vidin the tax rate is BGN 1.13 per 
kW, for the jurisdiction with center Dobrich - BGN 1.48 per kW, for the 
territorial structure with center Rousse - BGN 1. 11 per kW. The tax rate for 
vehicles with engine power between 74 kW and 110 kW in the jurisdictions 
with the centers of Razgrad, Silistra, Sofia and Stara Zagora for the period 
2012-2015 is also constant and correspondingly amounts to BGN 1.37 per 
kW, BGN 1.29 per kW, BGN 1.38 per kW and BGN 1.39 per kW. 
The analysis of the tax rates for transport vehicles with engine power 
between 74 kW and 110 kW also shows that for 2015 the tax rate was the 
lowest in the jurisdiction with center Ruse - BGN 1. 11 per kW and the 
highest - in the territorial structure with center Bourgas - BGN 1.54 per kW 
respectively. The rate in the territorial structure with center Bourgas is 39% 
higher than in Ruse, which gives reason to conclude that the difference 
between the highest and the lowest rate of tax rate is not big. This is, on the 
one hand. On the other, taking into account the fact that the lower and the 
upper limit for the tax on transport vehicles with engine power between 74 
kW and 110 kW are respectively BGN 1.10 per kW and BGN 3.30 per kW, it 
can be summarized that for all municipalities the rate is well below the upper 
limit set by the LTFA. 
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Table 1. Tax rates of selected local taxes in Bulgaria  
for the period 2012–2015 
 
Location 
Tax rate for non-
residential properties, 
owned by enterprises, ‰ 
Tax rate for transport 
vehicles with engine 
power between 74 kW and 
110 kW, BGN./kW 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Blagoevgrad 1.35 1.34 1.35 1.35 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 
Bourgas 1.57 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.53 1.54 1.54 1.54 
Varna 1.97 1.99 2.00 2.00 1.59 1.58 1.52 1.52 
V. Tarnovo 2.00 2.18 2.22 2.22 1.46 1.48 1.50 1.50 
Vidin 1.49 1.61 1.61 1.64 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 
Vratsa 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.89 1.20 1.17 1.18 1.18 
Gabrovo 1.51 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.14 1.14 1.15 1.15 
Dobrich 1.41 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 
Kardzhali 1.64 1.63 1.74 1.76 1.23 1.25 1.25 1.25 
Kyustendil 1.49 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.16 1.17 1.17 1.17 
Lovech 1.92 2.04 2.04 2.04 1.30 1.23 1.27 1.27 
Montana 1.66 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.11 1.15 1.15 1.15 
Pazardzhik 1.56 1.79 1.79 1.79 1.16 1.18 1.18 1.18 
Pernik 1.75 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.38 1.36 1.36 1.36 
Pleven 1.73 2.83 2.83 2.75 1.16 1.17 1.16 1.16 
Plovdiv 1.51 1.71 1.72 1.79 1.27 1.54 1.53 1.53 
Razgrad 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 
Ruse 1.28 1.31 1.31 1.31 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 
Silistra 1.69 1.68 1.67 1.67 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29 
Sliven 1.86 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 
Smolyan 1.65 1.81 1.82 1.82 1.20 1.19 1.18 1.18 
Sofia (capital) 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38 
Sofia 1.86 1.98 1.98 1.95 1.17 1.18 1.17 1.17 
Stara Zagora 1.45 1.46 1.43 1.43 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.39 
Targovishte 1.28 1.31 1.38 1.38 1.35 1.36 1.36 1.36 
Haskovo 1.98 1.95 1.90 1.90 1.40 1.39 1.40 1.40 
Shumen 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.73 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38 
Yambol 1.28 1.78 1.87 1.87 1.14 1.39 1.39 1.39 
Bulgaria 1.69 1.77 1.77 1.79 1.32 1.35 1.35 1.35 
Source: Institute for Market Economics. 
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Table 2. Tax rates of selected local taxes in Bulgaria  
for the period 2012–2015 
 
Location 
Tax rate of the annual 
license tax for  retail trade 
on a net selling space of the 
establishment not exceeding 
100 square meters – at the 
best selling space, 
BGN/square meter 
Tax rate on acquisition of 
property for consideration, 
‰ 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Blagoevgrad 11.36 11.21 11.22 11.22 1.96 1.97 1.96 1.96 
Bourgas 14.86 14.91 14.60 14.60 2.53 2.57 2.57 2.57 
Varna 16.72 16.54 16.54 16.54 2.61 2.62 2.62 2.62 
V. Tarnovo 11.98 12.00 12.02 12.02 2.49 2.55 2.60 2.60 
Vidin 4.33 4.53 4.53 4.53 2.54 2.55 2.55 2.55 
Vratsa 6.84 6.84 6.84 6.84 2.30 2.29 2.29 2.29 
Gabrovo 8.29 8.29 8.29 8.29 2.06 2.15 2.15 2.15 
Dobrich 9.67 8.69 8.70 8.70 2.82 2.92 2.92 2.92 
Kardzhali 8.03 8.03 8.03 8.10 2.46 2.48 2.48 2.48 
Kyustendil 11.04 9.96 10.05 10.05 2.03 2.06 2.06 2.06 
Lovech 10.93 10.52 10.52 10.40 2.19 2.30 2.30 2.30 
Montana 4.77 5.12 5.12 5.12 2.35 2.39 2.42 2.42 
Pazardzhik 9.35 9.05 9.05 9.05 2.32 2.70 2.70 2.70 
Pernik 6.63 9.89 9.88 9.88 2.29 2.08 2.08 2.08 
Pleven 9.32 9.23 9.24 9.24 2.75 2.78 2.78 2.77 
Plovdiv 13.88 13.25 13.12 13.12 2.35 2.41 2.41 2.42 
Razgrad 9.14 9.15 9.15 9.15 2.51 2.51 2.51 2.51 
Ruse 14.20 13.32 13.36 13.36 2.18 2.20 2.20 2.20 
Silistra 8.16 8.07 7.95 7.95 2.34 2.32 2.31 2.31 
Sliven 9.79 9.80 9.80 9.80 2.69 2.69 2.69 2.69 
Smolyan 7.67 7.49 7.56 7.56 2.44 2.48 2.43 2.43 
Sofia (capital) 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 
Sofia 10.46 10.03 8.81 8.87 2.47 2.56 2.56 2.54 
Stara Zagora 13.69 13.73 13.76 13.76 1.80 1.80 2.26 2.26 
Targovishte 9.03 8.87 8.88 8.88 2.24 2.23 2.23 2.23 
Haskovo 13.53 13.19 12.65 12.65 2.48 2.47 2.51 2.51 
Shumen 5.93 9.14 9.13 8.97 2.60 2.58 2.58 2.60 
Yambol 8.19 8.20 8.20 8.20 2.03 2.36 2.55 2.55 
Bulgaria 13.04 12.77 12.72 12.72 2.38 2.43 2.44 2.46 
Source: Institute for Market Economics. 
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The data in Table 2 can be used to analyze the dynamics of the tax rate 
of another local tax - the annual licence tax for retail trade on a net selling 
space of the establishment not exceeding 100 square meters – at the best 
selling space. On average, for all jurisdictions in Bulgaria, the dynamics of 
the tax rate for the annual licence tax at these parameters fluctuates within a 
narrow range - from BGN 13.04 per sq m in 2012 to BGN 12.72 per sq m in 
2015. However, when comparing the tax rates for the individual jurisdictions, 
the difference is significant and exceeds 400%. For example, the licence tax is 
the highest in the capital - BGN 20.00 per sq m and the lowest in the 
jurisdictions of Northwestern Bulgaria - BGN 4.53 per sq m selling space in 
Vidin and BGN 5.12 per sq m selling space in Montana. At the same time, the 
dynamics of the tax rate for the annual license tax for retail trade on a net 
selling space of the establishment not exceeding 100 sq meters – at the best 
selling space, for each territorial structure during the period 2012-2015 is 
insignificant. For the territorial structure with center Bourgas from BGN 
14.86 per sq m in 2012, the tax amount reaches BGN 14.60 per sq m in 2014 
and 2015, for Targovishte the change is from BGN 9.03 per sq m selling 
space in 2012 to BGN 8.88 per sq m in 2014 and 2015. For both jurisdictions, 
the change in the tax rate is towards decrease, albeit in very narrow limits. For 
the territorial structures with centers Vratsa and Gabrovo, the tax rate for the 
period 2012-2015 is constant - BGN 6.84 per sq m selling space and BGN 
8.29 per sq m selling space. The growth in the tax rate for the annual licence 
tax on retail trade for the period 2012-2015 is highest in the jurisdiction with 
centre Shumen - 51% and 49% in the jurisdiction with centre Pernik. 
The above suggests that tax rates are higher in the large territorial 
structures such as Sofia, Bourgas, Varna, Plovdiv, and much lower for small 
jurisdictions such as Vidin, Vratsa and Montana. It should be noted here that 
the low rate of the licence rate (for  retail trade on a net selling space of the 
establishment not exceeding 100 sq meters – at the best-selling space) cannot 
be considered as a competitive factor that attracts investors to these regions. 
The answer to the question of the existence or absence of tax 
competition between the different territorial structures also requires an 
analysis of the size of the tax rate on acquisition of property for 
consideration. The tax rate of the analyzed tax (see Table 2) on average for all 
jurisdictions in our country varies between 2.38 per cent in 2012, 2.44 per 
cent in 2014 and 2.46 per cent in 2015. In individual jurisdictions for the 
period 2012-2015 the dynamics is insignificant and ranges from 1% to 25%. 
The lowest is the tax rate for the acquisition of property for consideration in 
the jurisdiction with center Blagoevgrad – 1.96 per cent and the highest in the 
territorial structure with centre Dobrich – 2.92 per cent. It should be noted 
immediately that, according to the provisions of the Local Taxes and Fees 
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Act, the municipal council determines the tax rate on acquisition of property 
for consideration in the range of 0.1% to 3%. Therefore, for the jurisdiction 
with centre Dobrich, it is almost at the upper limit. The outlined dynamics in 
the tax rates by individual territorial structures again does not give grounds to 
postulate that investors motivated by the different tax rates on acquisition of 
property for consideration will direct their capital to jurisdictions the local 
councils of which have set lower rates. 
The definition of tax competition between municipalities as the 
sovereign right of territorial communities to determine both the tax base and 
the tax rate themselves gives grounds to summarize that we could hardly 
speak of such competition in Bulgaria. Territorial communities, as we have 
already argued, do not have the power to alter the tax base regulated by the 
LTFA. This, on the one hand, and on the other – they have the power to 
change the rate of tax at legally fixed lower and upper limits. However, the 
analysis of data related to the tax rates of the main local taxes shows that there 
were no significant changes in the 2012-2015 period in the analyzed local 
taxes. For example, the jurisdiction with center Kyustendil changes the rate of 
the real estate tax rate from 1.49 per thousand  in 2012 to 1.52 per thousand in 
2013, which size is kept by 2015 (2% increase). The jurisdiction with center 
Silistra reduces the same tax from 1.69 per thousand in 2012 to 1.68 per 
thousand (0.6% decrease) in 2013 and 1.67 per thousand in 2014 and 2015 ( 
0.6% down compared to 2013). Similar is the trend in the changes in tax rates 
of other local taxes. The tax rate for the tax on transport vehicles with engine 
power between 74 kW and 110 kW for a the jurisdiction with center 
Targovishte goes up from BGN 1.35 / kW in 2012 to BGN 1.36 / kW (an 
increase of 0.7 %) and remains steady until 2015. The changes in the licence  
tax on retail sales by individual jurisdictions is also to be considered 
insignificant, as is the dynamics of the size of the tax on the acquisition of 
property for consideration. 
The tax competition between territorial structures should be linked not 
only to the number and direction of the change in tax rates but also to the 
importance of the dynamics of these tax rates for the change of every specific 
local tax. Minor changes in the tax rates of the local taxes in the different 
territorial structures, on equal terms, result in minor changes in the tax 
liability. Moreover, for a number of jurisdictions, the rate for the analyzed 
local taxes is the same. In practice, this means that the product between the 
tax base and the tax rate does not change and, at all other things being equal; 
it is difficult to find arguments to justify the existence of tax competition 
between jurisdictions in Bulgaria. The conclusion is also confirmed by the 
insignificant differences between the sizes of the rates of the local taxes 
between individual municipalities. Therefore, the local structures in Bulgaria 
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do not use the determination of tax rates as a competitive advantage in terms 
of attracting investors and creating a more favourable environment for 
business development.  
The study of tax competition between municipalities also requires to 
investigate the issue of how high, respectively low, rates of local taxes 
correlate directly with investors' decisions to start a business in a particular 
jurisdiction. To provide an answer to this question it is important to analyse 
the data related to the relative share of the GDP flow in the municipal 
budgets, presented by the ratio Revenues and aids in the municipal budgets / 
GDP. In line with the national practice, the analyzed local revenues have a 
low relative share in GDP and, therefore, in the tax revenues in the public 
sector. For example, for the period 2012-2015, the absolute amount of 
revenues and aids accumulated in municipal budgets is in a narrow range - 
from BGN 1,687.9 million in 2012 to BGN 1,945.0 million in 2015 (Report 
on the implementation of the state budget of the Republic of Bulgaria, 2012, 
2013, 2014, 2015). The values of the ratio Revenues and aids in the municipal 
budgets / GDP also vary within narrow limits. The analyzed ratio changes 
from 2.05% in 2012 to 2.23% in 2014. At the same time, for the period 2012-
2015, the budgetary relationships of the municipalities with the Central 
Budget have higher absolute values than the local revenues and aids, and 
hence higher relative weights compared to GDP. For example, the budgetary 
relationships of the municipalities with the Central Budget in absolute terms 
for 2013 are BGN 2 594.5 million and for 2015 respectively - BGN 2 482.3 
million. The ratio Municipal Budget Relationships to the Central Budget / 
GDP for the two analyzed years is 3.16% and 2.8% respectively. There is also 
another interesting point - in our country "there is relatively inelastic, in 
relation to the macroeconomic development cycle, policy of transfers". 
(Zahariev, A., p. 23).  
The presented data clearly evidence that the own revenues of the 
Bulgarian municipalities are insufficient and the local authorities are 
dependent on central subsidies. In this sense, fiscal adjustments (including 
when not related to the specific dynamics of the macroeconomic situation) are 
a factor in limiting inter-jurisdictional tax competition in Bulgaria and are, 
therefore, an alternative to such a policy. 
Investors' decisions to start or continue their business in a particular 
jurisdiction do not only depend on the tax rates, the range of the base or the 
allowances; they also correlate with the fiscal burden of taxation. This is 
normal, given that "the functioning of the public sector in the conditions of 
fiscal decentralization reflects directly on the financial independence, 
sustainability and investment activity and indirectly - on the living standards 
of the municipalities" (Pavlova, M., p. 43). Paying taxes reduces the 
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disposable income of individuals and legal entities, i.e. of those who bear the 
tax burden. The specific meanings of the rates presented in Table 1 and Table 
2 strongly support the conclusion that the payment of local taxes in Bulgaria 
does not represent a significant cost for taxpayers - physical and / or legal 
entities2. In other words, the accumulation of local revenue does not 
significantly burden corporate and household budgets. That is why the high, 
resp. the low, rates of local taxes do not directly correlate with investors' 
decisions to start or relocate their business to a certain region of Bulgaria. 
For example, the low tax rates for the licence tax for retail trade in the 
jurisdictions with centers Vidin, Vratsa and Montana and the high rates for 
this tax in Sofia city do not motivate the entrepreneurs, in the first case - to 
invest and in the second - to migrate. In fact, a careful analysis of the 
investigated dependencies points to the conclusion that there is a relation in 
the reverse direction – the investments and the good business environment 
determine the tax rate and, on this basis, the size of local taxes. In turn, factors 
that are determinant for starting a business in a specific territorial structure are 
the condition of the local market, the quality of infrastructure, the 
unemployment rate and the qualification of labour resources, the degree of 
development of health, educational, cultural, etc., services.  
All of the above gives grounds to arrive at the following more 
important conclusions and summaries: 
Firstly, the tax base of the local taxes in Bulgaria is defined in 
accordance with the LTFA. The territorial structures do not have the power to 
influence its determination, and therefore, its size, despite certain tax 
allowances. Consequently, Bulgarian municipalities are deprived of the 
opportunity to gain competitive advantages through changes in the tax base.  
Secondly, the tax rates of local taxes are defined by the municipal 
councils within the range of the lower and upper limits regulated by the Local 
Taxes and Fees Act. Irrespective of the relative freedom granted in 
determining the rates (taking into account the specific characteristics of the 
region and the goals set by local authorities), the changes in the tax rates of 
local taxes in a given jurisdiction (horizontal dynamics) are insignificant. The 
difference in the tax rates on the vertical, i.e. between the regions, is also 
minimal. The rates are most often averaged between the upper and lower 
limits, and in none of the cases are fixed at one of these limits.  
                                                            
2 Note that the ratio between revenues from property taxes and GDP in Bulgaria is 
2.5 times lower than the EU average, and the ratio revenues from property tax / total revenues 
in the public sector is 2 times lower than the EU average. Within the EU, the payment of 
property tax deducts about 3% of the disposable annual income, and in our country the values 
of the same indicator are below 0.5%. 
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Thirdly, the financial autonomy of the Bulgarian municipalities is 
highly limited, as evidenced by the low relative share of the local own 
revenues in the GDP and the ratio of local tax revenues / tax revenues in the 
public sector. This fact, as well as the relatively low fiscal burden of the local 
taxes, does not motivate entrepreneurs and natural persons, to relocate their 
activity or to migrate because of the differences in the absolute amount of the 
tax liability.  
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